In the first we find values for the parameters in the model that fit the data best, and in the second we use probability theory to check whether the fit and, therefore, the assumed model is acceptable, by looking at the distribution of a suitable badness-of-fit statistic. Model checking could lead to a new model involving the two processes.
Among the discussants, MKV seem to suggest that data contain information only about the parameters in the marginal likelihood, but not about the unobservables (random effects) in the h-likelihood. Louis and Meng say that extended likelihood such as hlikelihood does indeed carry information about the unobservables, but that nevertheless the Bayesian approach is best suited for such inferences. We hope to show how the ideas can be combined together in the h-likelihood framework to give a new type of statistical inference. We shall try to make clear the inferential status of our framework.
The Bayesian framework is a well-defined mathematical structure about which theorems can be proved. However, it requires a statement of subjective prior belief about the unknown parameters which we are unable to provide. Of course many attempts have been made to define "objective" priors, but we believe them not to have been successful. As Barnard (1995) used to stress, in scientific inference the aim is to look for objective conclusions that scientists can agree upon. Senn (2008) puts it more strongly when he writes, "In fact the gloomy conclusion to which I am drawn on reading de Finetti (1974) is that ultimately the Bayesian theory is destructive of any form of public statistics." An alternative description is that we are looking across data sets for significant sameness, structures that remain unchanged when external conditions vary, a view which has been strongly propagated by Ehrenberg (1975) . Another problem of using priors on parameters is that however many data are collected, no information is added regarding the parameters in the prior. In contrast to the many possible priors in Bayesian framework, in our system there is only one corresponding prior likelihood (Pawitan, 2001 ) for pa-rameters, namely L(θ) = 1, and as data grow information is accumulated on all parameters in the model. Model checking is a vital part of inference and we regard accumulated information as necessary for model checking to be effective. Science is an entirely open-ended procedure, and there can be no possibility of assigning probabilities to all the models we have not thought of yet.
Louis says that our paper is, "more of an opinion piece than a scientific comparison of approaches." In fact, we see no fault in presenting an opinion piece; indeed, the title itself should prepare the reader for what follows. We have indeed carried out extensive simulations with a wide variety of data comparing our estimates with those of other methods, and so far h-likelihood estimates have been often uniformly better in terms of mean-square error. Some of these comparisons may be found in Lee, Nelder and Pawitan (2006) . We think our solution to mending the plug-in empirical Bayesian (Carlin and Louis, 1996) method is more straightforward than that of Louis which requires yet another level of priors. We have used the Laplace approximation when explicit expression for integration is not available. It seems to work well in problems involving unobservables, except for a few extreme cases where second-order Laplace approximations are required. We support the view that, "the art of applied mathematics is to know when to approximate." Louis seems to regard our paper as over-promotion of h-likelihood, but maybe that is because we are highly enthusiastic about h-likelihood. In the paper we do in fact make scientific comparisons as opposed to the typical Baysian, who rarely makes comparisons with other approaches. As we shall discuss in Section 4, with a Bayesian model, the h-likelihood is equivalent to the Bayes posterior so there is no disagreement in the case of a Bayesian model (see Bjørnstad, 1996 for more discussion). We try to give a unified framework for statistical methods developed by the three schools, but in our approach we regard a fixed parameter as simply unknown so that it differs from efforts of unification from the Bayesian side (Box, 1980; Little, 2006) .
We shall now respond to the discussants by topic instead of responding to individual contributions.
LP, MODEL CHECKING AND MODEL CHOICE
The likelihood principle (Birnbaum, 1962) provides a very good reason for using likelihood for inferences, but it does not show how this should be done. We have shown over the last 15 years how to do so. One drawback of LP and likelihood methods in general is that they do not tell us what to do when the model in use is not right. Suppose that we have a random-effect model. If the model is right the standard sandwich standard error estimators can be made from the marginal likelihood. However, we can have another sandwich estimator from the h-likelihood which is useful when the homogeneity assumption on the variance of random effects is violated (Lee, 2002) . H-likelihood also shows how to reduce the bias of the ML estimators in frailty models with nonparametric baseline hazards (Ha, Noh and Lee, 2010) .
MKV claim that inferences about unobservables cannot be made because they are not identifiable. This is not so. Unobservables can change their status to fixed unknowns once the sample has been observed, as we shall discuss in Section 6.2. Thus in principle unobservables can be estimated and model assumptions can be checked after the data have been collected. However, unobservables occur in various forms, for example, as a random effect or as a missing datum. One cannot extract any information about the latter from observed data while this can be done about the former. Thus for the latter, model checking based on observed data is not possible.
However, model checking is very important. We have shown that the distributional assumptions on the random effect can be checked, and have developed various model-checking procedures and criteria for model selection. Suppose we have two different random-effect models,
which lead to the same marginal model. The two models could have different numbers of random effects. For each model the assumptions about the random effects can be checked by the model-checking procedures given in Lee, Nelder and Pawitan (2006) . If the assumed model is correct we can give estimates for each random component. However, the individual random-effect estimators of the two models cannot be matched. Nevertheless, show that the two models, if equivalent, give the same inferences for equivalent quantities, for example, that W iŵ = U iû , giving the same predictions for the data,ŷ i (w) = x iβ + W iŵ =ŷ i (u) = x iβ + U iû . Now suppose that they lead to the same marginal model for y, but give different predictions for the data,ŷ i (w) =ŷ i (u). Then a model choice can be made from the deviances
where D(w) = D(u). These deviances are constructed from the conditional likelihood f θ (y|v) (see Lee and Nelder, 1996 and Pawitan, 2006, Chapter 6.5) . We, like Bayesians (Spigelhalter et al., 2002) use the so-called deviance information criterion (DIC) based on its degrees of freedom (see MacKenzie, 2007 and Vaida and Blanchard, 2005 for more discussion). MKV seem to regard two models as equivalent if they lead to the same marginal model. How can the two models with different predictions be equivalent? Consider a oneway random model (M1) leading to a marginal multivariate model with composite symmetric covariance structure (M2). They cannot be the same model because they give different predictors. The former (M1) exploits the covariance structure to give a better prediction. Regardless of how the data are generated, if the covariance structure is composite a symmetric one-way random model gives a better prediction than that based on the common mean of the marginal model (M2). The random-effect model is in fact an advancement on the marginal model because it shows how to predict. Various time series models and spatial models have been proposed in this respect. Suppose that the unobservables v are missing data y mis . Letŷ i (R) andŷ i (N R) be the predicted values of the missing data under missing at random (MAR) and missing not at random (MNAR), respectively. The deviances are then
Now suppose that the two missing mechanisms, MAR and MNAR, give the same predictions for the observed data while giving different predictions for the missing data. Then we have
where A = {y obs,i −ŷ obs,i (R)} 2 = {y obs,i − y obs,i (N R)} 2 . In this case we cannot make a model choice based upon the deviance because both y mis,i and their predictors are based upon the model assumptions for the missing data. Even thougĥ y mis,i (R) =ŷ mis,i (N R) we cannot observe y mis,i to evaluate them. In this case, given only the observed data, sensitivity analysis can be used to show how inferences aboutŷ mis,i (R) andŷ mis,i (N R) vary as the model for the unobservables changes. However, we may never be able to draw any conclusions from the analysis because we do not have the data y mis,i to check our thinking. We are also unable to say that we have checked for all the possible ways about which our thoughts may be wrong.
We agree that care is necessary, as MKV say, but something can still be done about inferences for random effects of the observed data.
NONPARAMETRIC, SEMI-PARAMETRIC MODELS AND GEE
It is not always easy to check all the assumptions of a given model. For example, with binary data it is hard to check the distributional assumption about the random effects. In semi-parametric frailty models with nonparametric baseline hazards we can relax the specification of probability models on certain parts of the model. However, this differs from the lack of a probability basis, such as is shown in some GEEs. In a given semi-/nonparametric model, there are many classes of submodels which belong to the model. It is not correct that estimating equations such as the quasi-likelihood estimating equations (father of GEE) satisfy only the first two moment (or minimal) conditions; Lee and Nelder (1999) showed that they satisfy all the higher cumulant conditions of a GLM family if it exists for the given mean and variance relationships. We have demonstrated that the estimating equations implicitly impose assumptions about the higher cumulants, so that a choice can be made depending upon the robustness of model misspecifications. We are not against the use of GEE when it has a proper model basis. However, its claimed advantage of less sensitivity to model assumptions results from not comparing like with like.
In HGLMs, the distribution of random effects can be relaxed to give nonparametric ML estimators (Laird, 1978) . Parameter estimates from binary GLMMs can be sensitive to the distributional assumptions of the random effects. A solution to this is to allow heavy-tailed distributions for the random effects, to give a robust analysis (Noh, Pawitan and Lee, 2005) . Thus various parts of the model assumptions in HGLMs can be relaxed to produce new nonparametric or semi-parametric models. Ha, Noh and Lee (2010) show that in semi-parametric frailty models h-likelihood extends the partial likelihood of Cox (1975) to produce new efficient estimating equations.
APHLS VERSUS MARGINAL POSTERIORS
Louis and Meng both say that our adjusted profile h-likelihood (APHL) in Section 3.2 is a Laplace approximation to their marginal posterior. This is not true because it can also eliminate fixed unknowns. Consider the h-likelihood,
Bayesian models are composed of two objects, namely the data and unobservables; θ is not fixed unknown, but unobservable. Thus their model is
where h = log f (y|v, θ) + log f (v|θ). Thus the Bayesian framework eliminates θ by integration, even with the use of the improper prior π(θ) = 1.
Suppose that all θ are indeed unobservables with a known distribution π(θ). Then the extended LP says that B carries all the information about unobservables (θ, v). In such a case the Bayesian approach gives suitable statistical inferences, and the Bayesian and h-likelihood inferences are equivalent.
But, suppose that θ represents fixed unknown parameters, rather than unobservables. As Meng says there is no truly noninformative prior, at least for continuous parameters. This means that for inferences about parameters, use of the Fisherian likelihood would be suitable. To eliminate nuisance parameters we could use profiling, conditioning or pivoting methods, as developed by Fisherian and frequentist schools. Fisher (1934) shows that
where m(θ) = log f θ (y),θ is the ML estimator and A is an ancillary statistic. A wonderful generalization of Fisher's work (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1983) gives the so-called magical formula,
where D(m, θ) is defined in Section 3.2 of the main paper.
Let θ = (ξ, τ ) with ξ being the nuisance parameters and τ being the parameters of interest. Suppose that ξ and τ are orthogonal parameters. Because the ML estimator is asymptotically sufficient, using the magical formula, we can eliminate the nuisance parameter ξ from the marginal likelihood,
where p ξ (m; τ ) is defined in Section 3.2 of the main paper, giving the Cox-Reid (1987) adjusted profile likelihood. This formula happens to be the same as the Laplace approximation, integrating out ξ. But it is actually using the Fisherian method of conditioning out the fixed parameters. This adjustment improves the profiling method (Lee, Nelder and Pawitan, 2006) . We note that the elimination of parameters and unobservables can be carried out in a uniform formula (APHL) which eliminates unobservables by integration (as with the Bayesian approach) and parameters by conditioning or (adjusted) profiling. Thus our APHL is quite different from the Bayesian marginal posterior. We believe that the prior on fixed parameters is informative if the APHL and marginal posteriors differ. In our framework we use profiling, modified (or adjusted) profiling, or pivoting, as developed by the likelihood school, to eliminate nuisance fixed parameters while we use integrating-out techniques, as developed in the Bayesian school, to eliminate unobservables. Our technique, among other things, extends REML from normal models to the GLM class.
HOW TO USE THE H-LIKELIHOOD
Clearly Meng understands how to form the hlikelihood for inferences. Most complaints are caused by misunderstandings about how to use the likelihood for statistical inference.
Neyman-Scott Problems and Nuisance Parameters
When the number of nuisance parameters increases with the sample size, the ML estimators, jointly maximizing nuisance and parameters of interest together, can give seriously biased estimates (Neyman and Scott, 1948) . Similarly joint maximizations of the h-likelihood provide seriously biased estimates, as Little and Rubin (1983) have shown. However, if we maximize an appropriate APHL we can avoid such problems (Lee, Nelder and Pawitan, 2006, Chapter 4) . When the number of nuisance parameters increases with the sample size, the profile likelihood is often not satisfactory, and APHLs have been developed for such cases. Yun, Lee and Kenward (2007) showed that Little and Rubin's (1983) complaints can be resolved by using appropriate APHLs. Lee, Nelder and Pawitan (2006) highlight the main philosophical difference between completed-data likelihood for the EM method and the h-likelihood. In the former missing data are treated as unobserved data, while in the latter they are nuisance parameters so that the technique developed for parameter handling can be used for the efficient imputation of missing data (Kim, Lee and Oh, 2006) . We have found that the h-likelihood may give very good imputation even up to 95 percent missingness while the EM method suffers from a slow convergence and distorted results with over 30 percent missingness (Lee and Meng, 2005) . We believe that our methods will lead to great improvements in the handling of missing data.
Invariance for Parameter Estimation and
Cauchy-Type Distributions MKV complain that the likelihood method gives point estimates with undefined variance. Suppose that y follows an exponential distribution with the log-likelihood m = − log λ − y/λ. The ML estimate for λ isλ = y. Here the observed Fisher information is I(λ) = (−1/λ 2 + 2y/λ 3 ) = 1/λ 2 which gives the correct variance estimator forλ. However, the ML estimate of 1/λ is 1/y whose moment does not exist so that its variance estimator from the likelihood theory could be seemingly meaningless. The ML estimators are invariant with respect to any transformation. When the sample sized is fixed, ML estimators may have scales where their moments do not exist. Let θ = δ/ϕ in equation (20) of the MKV discussion. Then y k is the ML estimator for θ k with a finite variance, for example, when 0 ≤ k < 1/2. The concept of variance may not be a useful measure of uncertainty in the ML estimator once the data are given. Whole likelihood curves or some feature of it such as the curvature would be useful (Pawitan, 2001 ); see more discussion below.
Invariance for the Estimation of Unobservables and Exponential Model
Meng points out that consistency theory may not be applicable to estimators for unobservables. It has been one of the aims of the development of h-likelihood procedure to overcome such difficulties. In our framework we use the marginal ML estimators for fixed parameters whose invariance is well established. To maintain such invariance for unobservables we fix the scale of unobservables in defining the h-likelihood and use the mode for inferences. The sample mean cannot maintain the invariance with respect to transformation of unobservables while the mode does. Because we are using the mode to derive point estimates for unobservables, its scale is important in defining the h-likelihood if we are to have good inferential properties. We appreciate that Meng gives a good theoretical contribution in deciding that scale. Another advantage of the mode estimator over the sample mean is that it also allows one to do model selection (Lee and Oh, 2010) instead of model average. Recently, Ma and Jorgensen (2007) have argued against the use of mode estimates for random effects and proposed the use of the orthodox best linear unbiased predictor (OBLUP) method. However, Lee and Ha (2010) show that the h-likelihood mode estimation gives both statistically better precision and maintains the stated level of coverage probability better than the OBLUP method.
Consider the exponential model of Meng in Section 7 of his contribution for predicting a future observation u = y n+1 . In Section 7.2 he uses the right h-likelihood h(λ, v; y) with v = log u, givingλ =ȳ n . Note thatû (λ) = E(u|y) = λ, which is the so-called best predictor, givingû = u(λ) =λ. Now compute the following information matrix as in (4.3):
gives the correct estimate of var λ (u|y). From
we get the correct estimate of
This also gives the first-order approximation to
The delta-method forv = logû gives what Meng has for the variance ofv but does not provide correct estimates for either var
We have shown that there exists some analogy between inferences for the fixed parameters and for unobservables. However, there also exist differences between them. For a fixed constant, let say λ = 3, we have g(λ) = g(3) for any function g(·). Such an invariance is meaningful for an estimator of an unknown constant and can be achievable by consistency of ML estimators for fixed unknowns. Suppose that we are estimating E(u|y) of unobservable u. Then, in general E(g(u)|y) = g{E(u|y)}, with equality holding only if g() is a linear function. Lee and Nelder (2005) showed that maintaining invariance of inferences from the extended likelihood for trivial re-expressions of the underlying unobservables leads to the definition of the h-likelihood. Once the data are observed we treat the unobservables such as random effects as fixed unknowns as discussed in the next Section so that we maintain g(û) = g(u) for any function g(·). However, the interpretation of the maximum h-likelihood estimator as E(u|y) holds only on a particular scale u.
Invariance for Parameterization and ML Estimation
In Bayarri's example, y k is the ML estimator of τ for τ = θ k . Here the consistency ofθ k fails, so that the unbiasedness ofθ k and exact variance estimator ofθ k would be meaningful properties to achieve.
Note that E(θ k ) becomes θ k , and var(θ k ) = I(θ k ) −1 = (−∂ 2 m/∂τ 2 | τ =τ ) −1 = 2k 2θ2k becomes var(θ k ) as k approaches zero. Thus these desirable properties can be achievable on a particular scale of θ. The existence of such a scale is important for inferences about fixed unknowns. For example, if there exists an exact confidence interval for a particular scale of a fixed parameter [let's say (τ − L,τ + U )], then it allows exact intervals for all parameterizations of τ ((g(τ − L), g(τ + U )) for any function g(·). A plot of the whole likelihood curve is useful to find a proper scale of intervals for unobservables too ).
IS THE H-LIKELIHOOD INTERVAL FOR UNOBSERVABLES A CREDIBLE OR FIDUCIAL OR CONFIDENCE INTERVAL?
Suppose that we have a model for the three objects (y, θ, v) where y and v are random variables (RVs) and θ is a fixed unknown parameter. The statistical model f θ (v)f θ (y|v) describes how the RVs y and v are generated.
Once the data are observed as y o, where the subscript o stands for "observed," y o are fixed knowns, no longer RVs. In the Bayesian framework all unknowns are considered as random without allowing fixed unknowns. Bayesians assume a prior for θ, making them random variables (RVs) so that the marginal posteriors π(θ 1 |y o ), π(v 1 |y o ), . . . etc. can be obtained by integrating out the rest of unknowns, regardless of whether these are fixed unknowns or unobservables. We find it mysterious how the fixed unknown parameters θ can change their status to RVs, leading to a prior probability π(θ) that generates θ.
Intervals for Parameters
Based on the likelihood L yo (θ) = f θ (y o ), frequentists can derive confidence intervals for θ (random interval for fixed unknown), and this has become a standard procedure. However, their argument is based on repeated sampling from the same population (RSSP) to which Fisher objected strongly. According to Fisher, when a scientist seriously "repeats" an experiment he always has in mind at least the possibility that the population of the previous experiment may turn out not to be the same population from which he is currently sampling. If he really knew the population of the new experiment was exactly the same as before he would think of himself either as enlarging his original experiment or wasting his time. So Fisher believed that the repeated sampling from different populations (RSDP) was crucial in making intervals for unknowns. The Bayesian credible interval, based upon π(v 1 |y o ), meets this goal because inferences are confined to the experiment of the observed data y o . Fisher tried to make an interval for θ, the so-called fiducial interval, under RSDP. But this RSDP assumption is too strong a requirement for his fiducial interval to be applicable in general (Barnard, 1995) while the confidence interval can be made in various contexts.
Intervals for Unobservables
The EB interval based on f (v 1 |y o ,θ) has different treatments for fixed unknowns θ and unobservables v. However, it cannot account for the information loss caused by estimating θ, leading to very liberal intervals. The Bayesian credible interval based on π(v 1 |y o ), while improving the EB interval a lot, can still exhibit strange behavior as shown in Figure 4 of the main paper. Louis has suggested some other priors to try. However, we object to putting priors for fixed unknowns and recommend using likelihood methods for inferences about them.
The observed data can be obtained as follows: From the statistical model f θ (v) the unobservables are realized (generated) as v r where the subscript r stands for "realized." Note the use of the term "realized" instead of "observed" to emphasize that they are fixed but still unknown. Then, the observed data y o are obtained from the model f θ (y|v r ). Now suppose that we want to make an interval for the fixed unknowns v r given y o .
For linear mixed models, Henderson (1975) shows that the standard error estimate from the Hessian matrix I(β, v) in (4.3) of the main paper gives an estimate of the unconditional MSE
In 1996, we showed that this holds more generally in HGLMs. This means that our proposed interval can be viewed as a confidence interval (random interval for fixed unknown) for RSSP whose probability statement is for unobserved future data. Simulation results in Section 4.3 are from RSSP. The proposed 95 percent interval may not always cover v r , but among 100 intervals, 95 of them are expected to cover the realized value. It was Booth and Hobert (1998) who showed that I(β, v) can also give an estimate of CMSE(v) = E{(v(θ) − v)(v(θ) − v) ′ |y 0 } for GLMMs with independent random effects. This result can be extended to nonnormal random-effect models ) and the correlated random-effect models in Section 4.3.1 (Lee, Jang and Lee, 2010) . Given the observed data, we can therefore make an interval (fixed interval for fixed unknown) whose probability statement is for all possible future realizations of v. Fisher's aim of making intervals for RSDP may be generally achievable for realized values of unobservables.
Louis says that we cannot account for the information loss caused by estimating the dispersion parameters while Bayesian marginalization can do so. In HGLMs dispersion parameters are orthogonal to the rest of parameters so that we do not actually need to account for the information loss caused by estimating them. In general, exactly the same method, that is, I(θ, v), is used to account for estimating all the parameters. The resulting interval is also identical to Kass and Steffey's (1989) approximate Bayesian credible interval (fixed interval for random unknown) with π(θ) = 1 (Lee, Jang and Lee, 2010) .
The probability statement of Bayesian interval based on π(v 1 |y o ) is different from the previous two intervals for fixed unknown. Probability statement of Bayesian credible interval is for RV, that is, the 95 percent Bayesian interval contains the unobservable with 95 percent probability given the data. Such a probability statement may not be relevant to the realized values of unobservables, but it is meaningful for inferences about unrealized unobservables, for example, inferences about future unobserved observations. Our proposed interval also allows such a statement for future observations without requiring priors on θ.
Our interval for unobservables could be a fiducial (fixed interval for fixed unknown), frequentist (random interval for fixed unknown) or Bayesian interval (fixed interval for random unknown), so allowing three different interpretations. Similarly, the APHL can be interpreted either as an approximate conditional likelihood eliminating nuisance fixed parameters by the magical formula or as an approximate marginal posterior using the Laplace approximation with π(θ) = 1.
Louis says for nonstandard problems where the purpose of analysis is to find the shape of the distribution for the unobservables (π (v 1 |y o ) ), Bayesians can offer a better algorithm using the MCMC method. For such problems we agree that MCMC-type methods are useful, but the question is whether we can do this without a subjective prior. Can we find a solution on which all three schools can agree? Why not consider MCMC applied to h-likelihood?
Asymptotic versus Finite Sample Properties of ML Estimators
Justification of ML inferences has relied heavily on asymptotic theory. On the other hand, Bayesian inferences are exact in finite samples, but require the B-club fee, priors for fixed unknowns. However, agreed or agreeable priors may hardly exist. We have illustrated that an exact finite-sample solution for the ML method is possible by finding a proper scale, but that search for an exact scale cannot be an easy task. However, a practically satisfactory scale can be often found without much difficulty and simulation results in Section 4.3 of the main paper show that likelihood inference using such an approximate scale can give a better finite-sampling property than putting unjustifiable priors for fixed unknowns. Therefore, there is a way of deriving finite-sample likelihood inferences without paying the B-club fee.
THREE IN ONE
Likelihood inferences are for models with two objects, namely, the data and fixed unknowns (parameters), while the probability-based inferences of Bayesians are for models with data and random unknowns (unobservables). Statistical models of recent interest often have both parameters and unobservables. So it seems beneficial to combine the inference methods developed by the three schools. We are glad that Meng found pivoting to be easy and useful for eliminating θ for his Bayesian inferences. Frequentists use probability statements to evaluate the performance of statistical methods. They use unobservables (unobserved future data obtained by RSSP) to invoke probability statements. By allowing all three objects in statistical models and inferences, we hope to accommodate the advantages of all three schools in a unified framework.
In discussing Lee and Nelder (1996) , Smith wondered whether it was time to bring the "two cultures" together. In Bayes's original paper (Bayes, 1763) an example is given of balls rolled on a table; this seems to us to be naturally expressible as a two-stage likelihood problem, leading to the question, "Was Bayes a Bayesian in the modern sense?" We are very aware that the model class we consider, though having a wide scope, is as yet incomplete, and also that there are aspects of the theory, in particular on the choice of scale for unobservables in the definition of the h-likelihood and on the choice of scale for exact finite-sample likelihood inferences, which are as yet incomplete. We are, however, particularly excited by the contribution from Meng which seeks to connect our procedures to other generally accepted statistical ideas. We hope that the time has indeed come to bring the three cultures together!
